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PKI implementation issues in B2B e-commerce 
 
Abstract 
The security of sensitive information transmitted and stored during e-
commerce transactions is clearly an overriding issue of concern to 
organisations and individuals. Not only is there a need for the protection of the 
confidentiality and integrity of sensitive information, but verification of the 
identity of a communicating party is often also necessary. Public Key 
Infrastructures or PKIs have long been promoted as an important part of a 
solution to these concerns, since they support the wide scale use of public 
key cryptography to fulfil end-user security requirements. Although PKIs 
involving a single CA are effective when implemented within a well-defined 
population, the implementation of PKIs across multiple domains and hence 
involving multiple CAs, e.g. as required for e-commerce, has encountered 
serious problems. The intention of this paper is to discuss the main reasons 




As has been widely discussed in the literature (see, for example, (Menezes, 
van Oorschot, & Vanstone, 1996)) public key cryptography (PKC) supports a 
variety of practically valuable cryptographic operations including encryption, 
digital signature and entity authentication.  The use of PKC requires all parties 
to have their own key pair, made up of a public key (usually widely distributed) 
and a private key (known only to its owner). Verifying a digital signature, or 
sending encrypted data, requires possession of a trusted copy of the public 
key of the creator of the signature or the recipient of the encrypted data. 
 
The trusted distribution of public keys is the primary purpose of a PKI. A PKI 
usually contains of one or more Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) called 
Certification Authorities (CAs).  A CA creates public key certificates, where a 
certificate is the concatenation of the name of an entity (the subject of the 
certificate) with the public key of that entity (and other data), all signed using a 
private digital signature key owned by the CA. If a third party possesses the 
CA's public key (often called a ‘root key’) then this can be used to verify the 
certificate and hence obtain a trusted copy of the subject’s public key. In 
general a PKI consists of a set of CAs, the set of certificates they have 
generated, the policy under which the certificates were issued, and various 
other parties (and protocol interfaces) involved in supporting the generation, 
management and distribution of public key certificates. 
 
Overview of PKI aspects in e-commerce 
PKI is the subject of standardisation by a number of bodies, including the 
IETF, ITU-T and ISO/IEC – for further details see, for example, (Mitchell, 
2000).  We now discuss how PKI can be used to support security 
mechanisms of importance to Internet e-commerce. 
 
In order to support a PKI service, a trusted third party (TTP), who plays the 
role of a CA, is required. Although there can be various types of TTP, 
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including trade platforms, public CAs, and corporate CAs (Helmich, 2000), we 
focus here on trade platforms that support B2B e-commerce security. 
 
PKI services in e-commerce 
 
In e-commerce, security of sensitive information and reliable identification of 
trading partners are very important factors. Confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication, and non-repudiation are all security requirements. These 
requirements can be supported by a variety of different key management 
architectures, e.g. secret-key based Key Management Centres (KMCs), as 
well as by PKIs.  Some significant benefits of PKIs over secret-key based key 
management architectures, such as those based on KMCs, are as follows. 
 
• In a PKI-based system, there is typically much less on-line interaction 
between clients and key management authorities (such as CAs) than 
there is in a secret key based system, where typically the KMC will be 
involved in setting up every session key. 
• Unlike in secret-key based key management systems, it is 
unnecessary for end-users to store a number of keys in order to 
exchange secured messages with a specific recipient. End-users can 
either transfer the necessary public key certificates between 
themselves, or can obtain the necessary certificates dynamically from a 
certificate repository. 
• In secret-key based systems, it is difficult to initiate a key exchange 
between parties from different organisations who have not previously 
communicated (Adams and Lloyd, 1999).  Supporting secure 
communications between such parties using a PKI, whilst still non-
trivial, is potentially much easier to manage.  The two organisations 
concerned must first agree how their PKIs can interact, and then they 
must generate a pair of ‘cross-certificates’, i.e. public key certificates 
generated by one CA for the public key of another CA – see, for 
example, Section 13.6.2 of (Menezes et al., 1996). In many cases this 
will be sufficient to enable all pairs of parties covered by the respective 
organisations' PKIs to set up secure communications.  
• The use of public key cryptography, as supported by a PKI, and in 
particular the use of digital signatures, enables non-repudiation 
services to be readily supported.  Such services enable one party to 
prevent another party denying having taken a particular action, e.g. 
sending a message.  Such services are very difficult to support in a 
secret key based architecture. 
 
PKI implementation requirements 
 
We next consider the steps that need to be taken by any organisation wishing 
to deploy a PKI.  Note that we focus our attention here on organisations 
wishing to use a PKI to support the provision of security services for B2B e-
commerce, although many of the remarks apply more generally. 
 
Stage 1: Gather information Potential PKI end-users must gather 
information about PKIs from either internal or external sources. This includes 
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information regarding the benefits of PKI implementation, the cost of PKI 
implementation, methods for providing a PKI, i.e. internal or external provision 
(outsourcing), PKI provider selection (in the case of outsourcing), i.e. which is 
the most cost-effective and trustworthy provider, and (in the case of internal 
provision) PKI software vendor selection. 
 
Stage 2: Make decision PKI end-users must make a decision as to whether 
or not to adopt a PKI based on the information gathered in the previous stage.  
If a decision to adopt a PKI-based solution has been made, the next step is to 
choose the method to provide the PKI. 
 
Stage 3: Choose PKI vendors There are advantages and disadvantages of 
both internal and external provision of a PKI. Using internal experts to set up a 
PKI may not always be feasible, e.g. because of a lack of expertise within the 
organisation. However, relying on PKI outsourcing also holds potential pitfalls 
and risks, e.g. breaches of confidentiality and breach of a company's 
obligations under data protection law (Fenn, Shooter, & Allan, 2002). 
 
Stage 4: Prepare infrastructure The infrastructure required to support a PKI 
is very complex, involving a variety of activities including CA policy and 
procedure establishment, CA initialisation, CA public key distribution, end-
user certificate generation and distribution (including user registration), 
revocation mechanism establishment, and (perhaps most important of all) 
user education. 
 
Stage 5: Implement PKI Once end-users have generated or been given their 
key pair(s), and have been provided with a certificate for their own public 
key(s), they can readily establish secure communications with other end-
users by validating and exchanging certificates as necessary.  However, 
private keys can be compromised and/or revoked for other reasons (e.g. 
because an individual changes their job).  Thus, before using a public key it is 
typically necessary to check whether or not it has been revoked.  This 
typically involves either checking a digitally signed Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) or making on-line checks with a trusted third party server which 
maintains accurate revocation information.  When using certificates across 
organisation boundaries, this revocation checking can become rather 
complex. 
 
PKI interoperability issues in e-commerce 
The most basic PKI architecture is one that contains a single CA that provides 
the PKI services, including certificate generation and the provision of 
certificate status information, for all PKI end-users.  Using and managing a 
PKI seems to be relatively straightforward within a ‘controllable environment’, 
such as a single organisation containing several subordinate departments. In 
B2B e-commerce, however, it is necessary to utilise a more complex PKI 
architecture involving multiple CAs, since it involves trading via digital means 
between partners who will typically each have their own CA. 
 
Apart from security services, there are other associated factors to consider, 
such as real-time service, time of goods delivery, etc.  To fulfil consumer 
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requirements, it is crucial for an e-commerce organisation to have efficient 
supply chain management (Lee and Whan, 2001).  Typical requirements for 
an e-commerce trading company are as follows. 
 
• A company must be able to communicate with its suppliers and 
customers quickly and securely in order to operate at maximum 
efficiency and to provide a timely service to its consumers. 
• A company must be able to co-operate with other e-commerce 
companies in order to share and exchange information. 
 
In order to meet these requirements, there is a need for e-commerce 
organisations to be able to establish secure communications links.  For 
example, for real-time value chain management, someone working in a 
factory for company A may need to communicate with someone in the 
accounts department of company B as well as someone in the procurement 
department of company C. It is natural to attempt to re-use existing PKIs, 
already established within companies for internal security, as the basis for 
secure inter-company communications.  Indeed, if this were to be possible, 
then the benefits would be potentially great. 
 
However it appears to be very difficult to achieve the necessary level of inter-
operation between two different PKIs. Fundamentally, a PKI is normally 
established with a set of rules and understandings about the meaning and use 
of public key certificates.  This set of rules may be explicit as a Certificate 
Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement, or it may be implicit.  The 
problem with inter-working between PKIs is that these sets of rules and 
understandings are almost inevitably different, which means that interpreting a 
certificate issued as part of a different PKI becomes very problematic. 
 
As a consequence, interoperability has become a serious issue impeding the 
growth of PKI in the e-commerce arena.  Although a number of efforts have 
already been made to try and facilitate PKI interoperability (see, for example, 
PKI forum, 2001), it remains a major problem. We now consider in somewhat 
more detail some of the reasons underlying these interoperability problems 
(similar work is being carried out by other parties, such as the Fiducia Project 
http://csrc.lse.ac.uk). 
 
Different X.509 extensions  
 
Typically, PKIs in different organisations will have been procured from 
different vendors. Hence, although all the public key certificates may conform 
to the current version of the X.509 recommendation (ITU-T, 2000), the two 
vendors will have chosen different options and will be using different sets of 
critical extensions, where a critical extension is a field in a certificate which 
must be processed by the verifier of the certificate. This arises because of the 
unbounded flexibility offered by the X.509 extensions. Furthermore, some of 
these extensions may be proprietary which, if they are critical, means that 
processing certificates may be impossible.  This is supported by (Helmich, 
2000), who states that certificates from Entrust may be incompatible with 
certificates from other vendors, such as Baltimore. 
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Different policies for issued certificates 
 
As briefly mentioned above, a Certificate Policy (CP) and a Certification 
Practice Statement (CPS) should be established in order to implement a PKI 
effectively.  Each company will potentially have a different CP and CPS, since 
they would normally be drawn up to reflect the particular practices and 
requirements of that company.  Hence, there will clearly be issues in 
interpreting the meaning and validity of certificates generated by a different 
organisation. 
 
Different obligations on certificate subjects 
 
Public key cryptography relies on the holder of a private key looking after it 
carefully, and preventing its disclosure to any other party, except as 
authorised by the CP in force.  The CP will typically place obligations on the 
certificate subject, i.e. the holder of the private key, to maintain the secrecy of 
his/her private key.  However, different policies may place different obligations 
on private key holders. Consequently, another issue that will vary between 
PKI implementations relates to the obligations on certificate subjects, in 
particular with regard to maintaining the secrecy of their private keys. 
 
Different liability protection 
 
A public key certificate, as issued by a CA, can be seen as a guarantee by 
that CA that a particular public key belongs to a specified entity.  Moreover, 
while the certificate’s expiry date has not passed and it has not been revoked 
by the CA, e.g. through a Certification Revocation List (CRL), there is an 
additional guarantee that the private key has not been compromised.  Of 
course, the meaning of this ‘guarantee’ will vary depending on the CP and 
CPS. 
 
Nonetheless, for the PKI to have much value, particularly for inter-company 
communications, one might expect the CA to take on some liability for the 
correctness of its guarantees.  That is, it might be expected to offer some kind 
of compensation in the event that an individual uses a certificate only to 
subsequently discover that it is not valid.  Problems will immediately arise in 
this context because different organisations will provide different levels of 
liability transfer.  This is potentially a very serious obstacle to PKI 
interoperation. 
 
Different features in PKI applications  
 
A PKI-enabled application is software that supports public key cryptographic 
mechanisms and accesses ‘the key/certificate life cycle-management 
functions’ (Adams and Lloyd, 1999: 269).  Different applications will have 
varying requirements on the nature of the underlying PKI, and different 
organisations will use different sets of applications. This may well mean that a 
PKI-enabled application in one organisation is simply unable to use a 
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certificate generated by a different organisation, irrespective of concerns 
about issues such as certificate meaning and CA liability. 
 
Different certificate storage and retrieval standards 
 
After they have been generated by a CA, public key certificates typically need 
to be available on-line for anyone who may need them.  There are two 
different standardised means for certificate storage and retrieval, namely the 
ITU-T X.500 recommendations (ITU-T, 2000) and use of IETF LDAP (Boeyen, 
Howes, & Richard, 1999).  Whilst LDAP is widely used, some systems are 
built around X.500, which can cause serious interoperability issues. 
 
Different PKI knowledge among organisational staff 
 
Adams and Lloyd (1999) claim that there is a shortage of staff who have a 
sophisticated understanding of PKI technology, probably because of the very 
recent rapid growth in availability and use of PKI-based solutions.  Knowledge 
regarding PKI is required not only for low-level staff, but also for high-level 
staff who are responsible for developing the CP. This need for understanding 
of the technology, when combined with the lack of staff with the required 
knowledge, itself contributes to difficulties in enabling interoperation between 
PKIs. 
 
Models for PKI interoperation 
A number of models exist for defining relationships between CAs. The choice 
of model itself affects the interoperability issue. The three models most 
commonly discussed are the hierarchical model, the peer-to-peer (or ‘mesh’) 
model, and the bridge model (see also figure 1). We now briefly introduce 
each of these models, and consider their advantages and disadvantages 
within the context of B2B e-commerce. 
 
Before proceeding note that the models essentially define which pairs of CAs 
establish a direct relationship.  This inter-CA relationship will involve the 
trusted exchange of public keys, and the generation of a pair of ‘special’ 
public key certificates, called ‘cross-certificates’.  That is, if CAs A and B 
establish a relationship, then A will sign a public key certificate for B, and vice 
versa.  If a ‘client’ of A, i.e. an entity within the scope of the PKI to which A 
belongs, wishes to verify a public key certificate signed by B, then the client 
can first verify the appropriate cross-certificate to validate B’s public key, 
which will then enable the client to verify B's signature on the target public key 
certificate.  This notion of cross-certification can be extended to a certification 
chain, where a series of cross-certificates ‘connecting’ the required pair of 
CAs is validated. 
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Hierarchical Model 
 
In the hierarchical model, all the CAs are arranged in a strict hierarchy, with a 
defined ‘root CA’ which is above every other CA in this hierarchy.  Every pair 
of CAs will then possess a common CA superior to them both in the hierarchy.  
This means that an end user can easily determine a unique certificate chain 
which will enable him to verify any other entity's public key. 
 
Whilst this sounds simple and appealing, it is not a model which readily maps 
to most real world situations.  The CA hierarchy needs to correspond to a 
matching trust hierarchy, or the solution will be almost impossible to operate.  
However, corporate entities operating CAs which need to interoperate to 
support B2B e-commerce will typically not belong to a natural trust hierarchy, 
and so the solution will simply not apply. Moreover, even if a hierarchy of CAs 
could be effectively operated, this puts an enormous load of trust on a single 
point of failure, namely the ‘root CA’. (However, this concentration of trust may 
be inevitable, as it also holds for a much more useable model, namely the 
bridge model, which we consider below). 
 
Peer-to-Peer (Mesh) Model 
 
The peer-to-peer model allows any pair of CAs to establish a cross-
certification relationship.  This corresponds much more closely to business 
reality, and will probably work well for small communities of organisations 
(small numbers of CAs) where every pair of CAs can set up a relationship.  
This will then mean that it will only ever be necessary for an end-user to verify 
a single cross-certificate. 
 
Unfortunately, such a solution will clearly not scale well to a large number of 
CAs, as we might expect to exist in a complex multi-national world of e-
trading.  Of course, it can be argued that it will not be necessary for every pair 
of CAs to establish a relationship, and certificate chains can be ‘discovered’ 
on an ad hoc basis.  There are two major problems with such an approach. 
First, it places a potentially unacceptable load on the end-user. Second, the 
likelihood of any effective transfer of trust, as required for PKI interoperation to 





The bridge model is, to some extent at least, a compromise between the 
previous two models.  In this model, one or more ‘bridge’ CAs exist, which set 
up relationships with all other CAs.  In this way a certificate chain consisting of 
a pair of cross-certificates will always be sufficient to enable an end-user to 
verify another user’s public key certificate. 
 
This model requires far fewer cross-certificates to be created then the basic 
peer-to-peer model, and yet still enables the end-user to readily establish a 
short and well-defined certificate chain.  The only problem that remains is that 
of identifying entities suitable to provide and operate the bridge CAs.  Such 
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organisations must have a well-defined trust relationship with every other CA.  
One possible candidate for operating a bridge CA might be a national 
government – as in the US federal bridge (Draft 101500, 2000).  Indeed, as 
reported in the draft, positive results from the operation of this Federal Bridge 
CA (FBCA) have been achieved. However, such a solution is unlikely to solve 
international interoperation issues. Hence other candidates are required. 
 
Addressing PKI interoperability issues 
We now consider how to address some of the PKI interoperability issues 
raised in the first section.  We provide a series of possible practical steps 
which may help to reduce these interoperability issues. 
 
Profile PKI standards Well-defined profiles for PKI standards must be 
established, strictly limiting the options for the structure of public key 
certificates, and in particular limiting the use of the extension fields.  These 
profiles must be carefully designed to both allow individual organisations the 
flexibility they need within their individual PKIs, and to provide for seamless 
interworking between organisations. 
 
Use and develop the bridge model The bridge model, as discussed in 
Section 6.3, has considerable potential to enable interworking between PKIs 
in a B2B e-commerce environment.  This has been supported by the results of 
the FBCA trials (Draft 101500, 2000). Further research into, and practical 
trials of, such bridge CAs is/are urgently required, in order to establish more 
precisely the degree to which such bridge CAs can successfully deal with the 
day to day interoperation requirements arising from B2B e-commerce. 
 
Educate staff regarding PKI technology In order to operate a PKI 
effectively, staff at all levels must be equipped with the necessary knowledge 
about PKI technology. This will enable the organisation management to set 
appropriate policies and practice statements, and also enable those operating 
the PKI to do it in a secure and effective way.  As with all aspects of security, 
all staff need to be made aware of the importance of operating and using a 
PKI in accordance with the policy and rules. 
 
Role of industry associations and trade bodies To make the bridge model 
work requires an appropriate organisation to operate a bridge CA.  For such a 
solution to work also requires general agreement about the meaning and 
management of public key certificates, i.e. the establishment of shared 
‘baseline’ CPs and CPSs.  The question then naturally arises as to who 
operates the bridge CA and who establishes the baseline CP and CPS.  
Whilst standards bodies and international treaties offer a possible solution, 
such approaches tend to take many years to come to fruition.  It may be much 
easier to achieve a timely solution through voluntary trade associations and 
industry organisations. Given that entire industries will have very major 
business incentives to find and establish speedy solutions, looking to bodies 
funded by the industry itself to generate the necessary solutions seems a 
reasonable approach. 
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New models for establishing liability transfer One issue raised above 
relates to the difficulties in establishing the level of liability protection offered 
by a different CA.  In fact this issue is a problem affecting almost every user of 
PKI technology. It is often difficult for a CA to find ways of generating sufficient 
revenue to be able to offer significant liability protection.  One way in which 
this general problem could be solved is through novel means of generating 
revenue for liability transfer.  One possibility which merits further research is 
through the use of on-line certificate status servers.  Such servers could make 
a charge for their service, and at the same time offer a ‘one off’ liability 
protection for this invocation of their service.  The certificate status server 
would essentially be offering a kind of insurance, with the fee being a 
premium for this insurance. 
 
Certificate translation services In the short to medium term, it is unlikely 
that all organisations within an industry sector will be able to agree and 
implement a single tightly-defined certificate profile.  Hence, for the next few 
years problems with the inability to process certificates generated by different 
PKIs will continue.  One possible means to address this problem is through 
the use of a certificate translation service (Borselius and Mitchell, 2000).  
Such a service would take a public key certificate as input, verify it, and then 
output a new certificate in a form processable by the requester.  This new 
certificate would, of course, be signed by the translation server rather than the 
original CA, and hence the translation server would need to be trusted.  
Indeed, such a server could be integrated with the bridge CA and/or with a 
certificate status server, thereby reducing the number of required trusted 
nodes. Such an approach would remove the need for every end-user to be 
able to process every other user’s certificates, and would simply require one 
server to be equipped with the means to understand every certificate type. 
 
Government support National governments (and supranational bodies such 
as the European Commission) can also play an important role in supporting 
the measures necessary to achieve PKI interoperation. For interactions 
occurring only at a national level, government-backed bridge CAs (such as 
the FBCA) will be appropriate. Governments can also provide guidance on the 
use and contents of certificate profiles, e.g. by promoting standards 
development or by directly supporting the necessary research and 
development. 
 
Establish connections among Bridge CAs Although the FBCA can 
establish trust relationships among different PKI platforms, it is of limited value 
if two organisations would like to trade internationally. However, one possible 
solution might be to first establish national bridge CAs, and then establish 
connections with other national bridge CAs using the PKI mesh model. In this 
case, the issue of the large number of CAs may not be such a serious issue, 
since the number of countries is far less than the number of companies who 
may wish to conduct B2B e-commerce. 
 
Conclusions and remarks 
The use of PKI to underpin B2B e-commerce security has many advantages, 
not least since many organisations have already implemented PKI to support 
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internal security functions.  However, as we have discussed in this paper, 
there are a number of serious interoperability issues limiting the use of a PKI 
across organisation boundaries. Removing these obstacles to PKI 
interoperation is critical for the future health of B2B e-commerce.  We have 
proposed a series of practical steps which can be used to try and address the 
major PKI interoperability problems, thereby promoting the future use of PKI 
across corporate domain boundaries. 
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